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CRIME, URBAN FLIGHT, AND THE
CONSEQUENCES FOR CITIES
ABSTRACT
This paper demonstrates that rising crime rates in cities are correlated with city depopulation.
Instrumental variables estimates, using measures of the certainty and severity of a state’s criminal
justice system as instruments for city crime rates, imply that the direction of causality runs from
crime to urban flight. Using annual city-level panel data, our estimates suggest that each additional
reported crime is associated with a one person decline in city residents. There is some evidence that
increases in suburban crime tend to keep people in cities, although the magnitude of this effect is
small. Analysis of individual-level data from the 1980 census confirms the city-level results and
demonstrates that almost all of the crime-related population decline is attributable to increased out-
migration rather than a decrease in new arrivals to a city. Those households that leave the city
because of crime are much more likely to remain within the SMSA than those leaving the city for
other reasons. The migration decisions of high-income households and those with children are much
more responsive to changes in crime than other households. Crime-related mobility imposes costs
on those who choose to remain in the city through declining property values and a shrinking tax
base.
Julie Berry Cullen
Department of Economics, E52
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slevitt@fas.harvard. eduThe difficulties confronting large American cities in recent decades are well
documented.’ The urban riots of the late 1960s turned the post-war suburbanization trend
into large-scale urban flight. A declining tax base, shrinking federal subsidies, tax
limitations, and city residents in need of greater public services has pushed many cities to
the brink of fiscal crisis. Among the greatest difficulties faced by large American cities is
crime. Violent crime rates in U.S. cities with populations over 500,000 in 1993 were four
times higher than in cities with populations below 50,000, and seven times greater than in
rural areas. z Higher crime rates in large cities are even more remarkable when one
considers that both per capita expenditures on police and the level of victim precaution
(e.g. locking doors, private security guards, alarm systems) are much greater in large
cities.3
This paper examines the link between crime and urban flight.4 Although there is an
extensive literature analyzing this subject (e.g. Taeuber and Taeuber 1965, Bradford and
Kelejian 1973, Frey 1979, MarshalI 1979, Marshall and O’Flaherty 1987), there has been
relatively little focus on the role of crime in explaining the phenomenon, A handful of
studies have included the level of crime as a right-hand side variable in cross-city OLS
1 See, for instance, Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1 982), Gottdeiner (1 986), Wilson
(1 987), and Inman, Craig, and Lute (1 994).
2 The Uniform Crime Re~o rts, which reflect only those crimes reported to the police,
are likely to understate the actual difference in crime rates across city types because of the
greater likelihood a crime will be reported to the police in smaller cities (Levitt 1995),
3 In 1990-1991, cities with population over one million spent an average of $210 per
capita on police protection, whereas cities with populations below 75,000 residents
expended an average of $97 per capita (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993).
4 While urban flight is interesting in its own right, declines in city population are also
correlated with increases in the percent of families below the poverty line in the city, the
fraction of city residents failing to complete high school, and declines in median housing
values. Thus, urban flight proxies for city decline more generally.
1estimates of urban flight. These studies typically obtain a positive relationship between
crime rates and urban flight (e.g. Frey 1979, Grubb 1982, Katzman 1980, Sampson and
Wooldredge 1986).5
In contrast to previous research on the topic,
impact of changes in crime rates rather than levels.
our analysis focuses primarily on
There are both theoretical and
the
methodological justifications for examining changes in crime rates. From a theoretical
perspective, the simplest residential choice model predicts that changes in crime rates, not
levels, will influence changes in city populations On a practical level, focusing on changes
mitigates problems associated with non-comparabilities in crime reporting rates, crime
definitions, and police department practices across cities (O’Brien 1985).
Section I documents the strong empirical correlation between rising crime rates and
central city population declines using a panel of 137 cities over the period 1976-1993.
After controlling for other factors, each additional reported crime in a central city is
associated with a net decline of about one resident. Higher suburban crime rates tend to
keep people in central cities, although the magnitude of this effect is much smaller than for
crimes within cities.
Of course, one cannot necessarily draw any causa/ conclusions from these
5 Previous research has also documented a positive relationship between population
turnover and crime rates at the neighborhood level, especially in poor neighborhoods (Smith
and Jarjoura 1988, Taylor and Covington 1988). In contrast to that literature, which
focuses on gross flows of residents, our analysis is concerned with net population changes.
G In a simple model where property values fully capitalize the costs and benefits of a
location, then changes in amenities can be captured by changes in housing values without
any net population change. Relocation costs and heterogeneous tastes affect the
composition of the residents, but do not necessarily imply any change in the total number
of city residents. In this paper, we take the empirical regularity of fluctuating city
populations as a starting point, leaving the theoretical puzzle of why property values do not
fully adjust for future work.
2estimates. While the most obvious causal link runs from rising crime rates to urban flight,
it is also possible that an omitted third factor may be responsible for both rising crime and
urban flight. For instance, if population loss in shrinking cities is disproportionately
comprised of high income individuals (who tend to have lower rates of crime victimization),
then the average crime rate among remaining city residents will rise, even if each resident’s
risk of victimization is unchanged. On the other hand, since crime rates are strongly
positively correlated with city size, city growth is likely to be correlated with rising crime
rates. If that is the case, OLS may understate the causal impact of crime on city
population.
We attempt to establish a causal link between crime and urban flight through the
use of instrumental variables in Section Il. A valid instrument must affect the crime rate
but not otherwise belong in the equation explaining city population changes. The logical
source of such instruments is changes in the punitiveness of the criminal justice system. In
particular, we use lagged changes in state prison commitments and state prison releases
per crime. These variables are demonstrated to affect crime in the predicted manner, yet
are plausibly excluded from the city population equation. The estimated impact of crime on
city population using 2SLS are slightly larger than the OLS estimates, suggesting that any
bias in the OLS estimates resulting from omitted variables or compositional changes in city
population is overwhelmed by the tendency for large cities to have higher crime rates.
A major limitation of the above panel-data analysis is that it addresses only
aggregate population changes. Using PUMS data from the 5 percent sample of the 1980
census yields a number of additional insights in Section Ill. We are able to obtain estimated
migration in and out of 81 U.S. cities by income category, race, and family status. Using
census data, it is also possible to distinguish between increasing out-migration and
3declining in-migration and to identify the destinations of those who leave cities. Our results
suggest that almost all of the impact of crime on city population results from increased out-
migration; the link between changes in crime and in-migration appears weak. Seventy
percent of those people leaving central cities due to crime remain within the SMSA,
compared to forty percent of all central city out-migrants. The mobility decisions of high
income households are five times more responsive to changing crime rates than those of
the poor. Whites and blacks show similar responses to crime. Households with children
are twice as responsive to crime as households without children.
Section IV summarizes the results of the paper and provides rough calculations of
the costs of crime and crime-related mobility for cities and their residents. In addition to
the direct costs of victimization, crime imposes numerous other costs on city residents.
Because crime-related out-migration is concentrated among the rich, rising crime will be
accompanied by increasing concentrations of poverty. While those remaining in the city
are likely to have greater need for locally provided public services such as police protection,
public education, public transportation, and city hospitals, the ability to provide those
services is diminished. Evidence also suggests that rising crime rates are associated with
declining housing prices, eroding the property tax base, which is the primary revenue
source of cities, In the presence of fiscal increasing returns (Blanchard and Summers
1987), cities can be caught in a downward spiral in which rising tax rates lower real
wages. To the extent that peer effects are important to human capital development (Case
and Katz 1991, Benabou 1993, Cutler and Glaeser 1995) the exodus of the most mobile
groups will exert a further negative externality on those left behind.
4Section 1: Correlations between Changes in Crime and Chanaes in Citv POK)U Iation
We begin our analysis by specifying a simple reduced-form relationship between
changes in crime and changes in city population. We include changes in both central city
and suburban crime rates in the specification, along with a range of other covariates
described below to capture socioeconomic, economic and demographic characteristics of
the city, SMSA, and state. Our logic for focusing on changes in crime rates is that in
equilibrium, the previous level of crime in a city will already have been incorporated into the
individual’s residential choice decision (although potentially with some adjustment lag).
The theoretical prediction that changes and not levels of crime should effect changes in
city population is strongly supported by the empirical evidence presented later in the paper.
The basic specification we employ is as follows:
Aln (CITY_ POPit) = ~lACITY CRIMEit + fi2ASUBURB_CRIMEit + P3UNEM
+ ~4INC;MEit_l + ~~aln (S TATEPOpit_l) (1)
+ B6%BLACKit_1 + AGEit_l G + At + Yr + eit
where the subscripts 1, t, and r index cities, time, and regions respectively. The population
variable is in log changes whereas the two crime variables are in changes in per capita
rates. This specification allows the impact of changes in crime on mobility to be
independent of the level of crime; other specifications such as log changes in both crime
and population, or changes in levels of both variables, lead to similar results when
evaluated at the sample mean. With the exception of the crime variables, which enter
contemporaneously and will be instrumented, one year lags are used for all of the other
covariates to reduce endogeneity problems.’ In addition to economic controls, a set of
7 It is unclear whether these covariates should enter in levels or changes. The same
logic that makes changes rather than levels of crime rates appropriate suggests changes for
5variables reflecting the age distribution of the population, lagged log-changes in state
populations, and a variety of indicator variables are included to capture other systematic
sources of variation.
Equation (1) is estimated using a
137 U.S. central cities with populations
panel of data covering the years 1976-1993 for
greater than 100,000 in 1975. Throughout the
analysis we allow for heteroskedasticity by city size. Data limitations necessitate a number
of compromises because the analysis is performed at the city level. Annual data on net
migration is unavailable, so changes in overall city population, which are influenced not
only by migration but also by birth, death, and immigration rates, are used instead. Birth
and death rates (approximately 1.5 and 0,9 per hundred) are relatively low compared to
gross flows due to migration (roughly six percent of the U.S. population moves across
county lines each year (Schwartz 1987)). a Immigration rates in the United States over the
time period examined are roughly 0.2 percent per year. Sampson and Wooldredge (1 986),
using data from the decennial census, find that their results are not sensitive to the choice
of overall city population changes versus net migration flows. Our results are also robust
to the use of net migration data from the Census in Section Ill.
The crime rates used are the per capita number of index crimes reported to the
police and collected in Uniform Crime Re~orts. Given that less than half of all
these other variables as well. On the other hand, the demographic controls may be picking
up differential levels of mobility across groups (e.g. young adults move six times as
frequently as those over age 65), which suggests levels as the correct choice. The results
that follow include levels. An earlier version of this paper (available on request from the
authors) utilized changes with little effect on the crime coefficients.
8 Moreoverr movers affect city populations in both the community they leave and the
community they move to, whereas births and deaths affect only one community. This
effectively doubles the importance of migration in explaining city-level population flows.
6victimizations are reported to the police, the UCR crime data are potentially contaminated
by substantial measurement error. Victimization data, however, is not available below the
level of regions, necessitating the use of UCR statistics. In a previous version of this
paper, we attempted to disaggregate crimes into violent and property, obtaining similar
coefficients on both types. The high degree of collinearity between those two crime
classifications makes it difficult to separately identify the coefficients, particularly in the IV
estimates presented in Section Il. Consequently we present only estimates aggregated
over all crime categories in the tables; full results disaggregating crimes into violent and
property are available from the authors on request. We use crime rates in the rest of the
Metropolitan Statistical Area, excluding the central city, as our measure of suburban crime.
The types of covariates available in a city-level panel are less than ideal. Most city-
Ievel data is collected only in decennial census years, necessitating a tradeoff between the
level of aggregation of the data and the frequency of collection. As a general principle, we
use the most disaggregated annual source of data available in our regressions.
Unemployment rates are available annually by SMSA. Per capita income is available on a
yearly basis at the state level. The age distribution of the population is also available
annually by state. We choose to linearly interpolate the percent of a city’s population that
is black from decennial census data rather than using state-level data. In the OLS
regressions of this section, the primary strategy adopted for minimizing the problems
associated with the lack of good controls is the inclusion of numerous indicator variables:
year dummies, region dummies corresponding to the nine census regions, and city-fixed
effects. Because the left-hand side variable is already in differences, a city-fixed effect
picks up within-city trends over time. In some cases, we replace the year and region
indicators with region-year interactions to better control for regional economic and
7demographic shifts as well as possible changes over time in tastes for climate or other
regional characteristics. Two further points about the lack of good control variables are
also worth noting, First, in the instrumental variables estimates, as long as the omitted
variables are uncorrelated with the instruments, consistent estimates of the crime
parameters will nonetheless be obtained. Second, in Section Ill of the paper where we use
individual-level data from the census and therefore have a much better set of controls, we
obtain similar results whether we use the limited set of covariates utilized here or a greatly
expanded set of covariates including household-level controls.
Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 1. For those variables that
enter equation (1 ) as changes, summary statistics for both the levels and changes are
shown. OLS regression results are presented for a range of specifications in Table 2.
Column 1 corresponds directly to equation (1). Column 2 adds city-fixed effects. Column
3 includes both city-fixed effects and region-year interactions. Columns 4-6 mirror the first
three columns with once-lagged crime levels added to the specification.
The coefficients on the crime rate changes are in the top two rows. Including city-
fixed effects and region-year interactions improves the fit of the model but has little effect
on the crime variables. The crime coefficients are statistically significant in all
specifications. For the purposes of interpreting the results, the change in city residents for
each additional reported crime is a useful measure of the magnitude of the effect. It is
straightforward to demonstrate that D1 closely approximates (but slightly overstates) that
measure and thus is directly interpretable. g The interpretation of ~z is more complicated,
9 The larger is the variation in crime rates relative to the variation in city populations,
the closer is the approximation. In our data, the standard deviation of percent changes in
year-to-year crime rates is five to six times larger than the corresponding value for city
populations.
8however, because it depends on the relative sizes of the city and suburban populations. In
our data, suburbs on average have three times as many residents as central cities. Thus,
to determine the change in city residents per additional suburban crime at the mean of our
sample, one must divide ~z by
is associated with a decline in
three. According
city population of




suburban crime rates translate into an impact about one-sixth as large as that for city crime
rates. A one-standard deviation change in city crime rates (roughly a ten percent change
in crime), translates into a decline in city population of slightly less than one percent.
The other covariates enter in a plausible manner. A percentage point change in
SMSA unemployment leads to a 0.035 to 0.23 percent decline in city population. This
translates into a decrease of between 5 and 35 city residents for each 100 additional
persons unemployed. That estimate is similar in magnitude to the state-level estimates in
Blanchard and Katz (1 992), The size of the unemployment effect on city populations
increases substantially when city-fixed effects are included. There is some evidence that
cities located in states with higher per capita income tend to grow faster. Cities with a
higher initial fraction of black residents appear to grow more slowly, mirroring the earlier
findings of Frey (1 979). There is little within-city variation in percent black, however, so
with city-fixed effects the estimates are imprecise. The age coefficients, which are relative
to the omitted category “over age 65, ” flip sign with the inclusion of city-fixed effects.
The coefficient on lagged state population growth is very large with estimated elasticities
between 0.33 to 0.64. Excluding this variable, however, has little impact on the crime
parameters.
The specifications in columns 1-3 of Table 2 assume that changes in crime and
population occur contemporaneously. To test the possibility of partial adjustment or lagged
9responses to crime, columns 4-6 include the once-lagged crime rate in levels. None of the
lagged crime rates are statistically significant, and the magnitudes of the coefficients are
generally less than a tenth as large as those associated with changes in crime rates.
Lagged crime changes also appear to have weak explanatory power, as do /cads of crime
changes.
We have also explored numerous other variants of the basic specification (not
shown in tabular form). Estimating the model using fixed effects or longer differences in
place of one-year differences yields similar estimates. Dividing the sample according to
time period, we cannot reject the null of equal coefficients across the two parts of the
sample. Finally, splitting the sample by city size, we cannot reject the null of equality
across cities greater than or less than 250,000 in population.
Sect ion 11:Establishing Causa Iitv in the Relationship between Citv PODulations and Crime
w
The preceding section documents a strong negative correlation between changes in
crime rates and changes in city populations, but cannot provide any clear guidance about
the direction of causality. While one possibility is that rising crime rates lead to urban
flight, there are also a number of plausible channels through which population changes
might affect crime rates. Looking cross-sectionally, crime rates are much higher in large
urban areas, suggesting that increases in city population lead to higher crime rates, due
perhaps to increased criminal opportunities in densely settled areas, the increased
anonymity of big-city life, or because big cities attract likely criminals (e.g. Glaeser and
10Sacerdote 1996).’0 If that is the case, the estimates of the previous section may
understate the true causal relationship between city crime and depopulation since city
growth will lead to higher crime rates.
On the other hand, there are a number of factors suggesting that the OLS estimates
may overstate the true magnitude of the causal impact of city crime. First, an omitted
third variable that is positively correlated with changes in crime rates and negatively
correlated with city population changes could explain the negative OLS coefficient.
Second, if the pool of residents in shrinking cities is increasingly comprised of less mobile
groups that are also more likely to engage in criminal activity, then depopulation might be
associated with increasing per capita crime rates.’l Wilson (1 987) further argues for non-
Iinearities between concentrations of poverty and crime that would exacerbate this bias.
Third, if there is measurement error in city populations, then a ratio-bias problem is present
since crime rates are defined on a per capita basis. Unlike the standard regression model
where measurement error in the left-hand side variable will not bias the coefficients, when
the dependent variable appears in the denominator of the right-hand side variables,
measurement error induces a negative bias.12 Finally, city population may be an incorrect
10 Where data are available, urban crime rates are almost always higher than rural crime
rates. Beattie (1 995), for instance, reports that for the period 1690-1720, prosecutions for
offenses against property in the city of London were almost seven times greater than the
mostly rural counties of Essex and Sussex, An apparent exception to this pattern is
American cities in the late 1800s; the emergence of the professional police force in the
latter half of the 19th century appears to have dramatically reduced the amount of disorder
in large American cities (Monkkonen 1981).
11 One caveat to this argument is that the rich are more likely to report crimes to the
police than the poor, so even if the actual victimization rate rises due to compositional
changes, the reported crime rate may not.
12 When an individual household’s mobility decision is used as the dependent variable in
Table 8, ratio bias is not a concern. The results are unaffected, suggesting ratio-bias is not
11denominator for crime rates if a large fraction of the victims of crime are commuters or
tourists, If many former city residents relocate to the suburbs but continue to work in the
central city and be victimized therer13 this could induce a spurious negative correlation
between city populations and city crime rates as measured in this paper.
We attempt to determine causality through the use of instrumental variables. In
what follows, we focus our efforts on instrumenting for city crime rates, treating suburban
crime rates as exogenous to city population. From a theoretical perspective, the
endogeneity stories discussed above are more directly applicable and compellin9 for city
crime rates (e.g. reverse causality and ratio bias). Empirically, we have also experimented
with instrumenting for both city and suburban crime rates, with no impact on the city crime
coefficients. Because of a weaker first-stage fit, we can never reject that the suburban
crime coefficients are equal to zero when instrumented.
Valid instruments for the city crime variable must affect city crime rates, but not
otherwise belong in the equation determining city population changes. The natural choices
of such instruments are measures of the severity of the state criminal justice system,
which will reduce crime either through deterrence or incapacitation, but should have little
effect on city migration except via crime. The two instruments we use exploit the well-
documented crime-reducing impact of prisons. Prisoner self-reports suggest that the
median prisoner commits roughly 15 index crimes a year prior to incarceration (Dilulio and
Piehl 1991, Spelman 1994). Panel-data analyses using state-level aggregates, which
capture not only incapacitation, but also deterrence and replacement effects, yield
a major problem here.
13 Census data on place of work suggests that roughly 80 percent of those who work
in the central city continue to work there after moving residence to the suburbs.
12estimates of crime reductions per prisoner of similar magnitudes (Marvell and Moody 1994,
Levitt 1996).
The particular instruments used are lagged changes in the commitment and release
rates of state prison systems per reported crime in the state. Commitments include both
new prison terms resulting from criminal convictions and commitments resulting from
probation and parole violations.14 These variables capture both incapacitation effects and
deterrence via the certainty and severity of punishment in the state. A high commitment
rate implies a high likelihood of detection and conviction. A low release rate translates into
a longer mean punishment per conviction.
These prison population flows include convictions for crimes other than the index
crimes considered in this paper, notably drug offenses. In 1993, 22 percent of state
prisoners were held on drug-related charges only, up from 6.4 percent in 1979. The state
prison data also does not include either federal prisoners or those held in local jails. Though
imperfect, the instruments are still highly correlated with crime rates. The instruments are
unlikely to be strongly correlated with changes in city populations, however, except
through their impact on crime rates. This is particularly likely to be true since the
instruments are defined at the state level rather than the city level, The average city in our
sample represents only seven percent of the population and only eleven percent of the
crime for the state in which it is located .15
14 When entered separately, new commitments and parole and probation-related
commitments had similar coefficients in the first-stage regression and the 2SLS results
were not substantially affected.
15 State prisons generally are not located in big cities which could potentially induce a
negative correlation between city populations and commitment rates: when many city
residents are being sent to prison, the removal of those offenders will reduce city
populations. Our reduced form estimates, however, find that commitment rates and city
13One potential problem with the instruments selected is the fact that they are
denominated by crime rates (albeit state crime rates) while they are also instrumenting for
crime rates. In the absence of measurement error, the presence of crimes in the
denominator of the instrument does not result in any contamination of the instrument if the
functional form is correctly specified. With measurement error in reported crime rates,
however, ratio bias arises. There are two important points to note on this topic. First, the
instruments are constructed using state-level rather than city-level data and individual cities
generally represent a small fraction of state crime. Nonetheless, we attempt to lessen this
source of bias by using only lagged values of the instruments. Second, ratio bias will
exaggerate the negative relationship between commitments and the crime rate in the first-
stage regression while the effect of releases will be systematically understated.
Empirically, however, we find that commitments and releases carry coefficients of similar
magnitude.
Columns 1-3 of Table 3 present the first-stage estimates using the same sets of
covariates used in the previous section. In all cases, the instruments enter with the
expected sign: a higher rate of prison commitments reduces crime whereas more releases
are accompanied by crime increases. As reported in the bottom panel of the table, the
prison variables are jointly significant at the .01 level for all of the crime regressions.
Releases and commitments have similar effects. A one-percentage point increase in the
prison commitment or release rate per crime shifts city crime by roughly six percent over a
two-year period. The demographic and economic variables included in the regressions are
generally not strong predictors of crime rates having controlled for the other factors.
populations are positively correlated, implying that this source of bias cannot explain our
results.
14If prison commitments and releases are valid instruments for crime rates and there is
a negative causal link between crime and city populations, a reduced form regression of
city population on the instrumental variables should yield coefficients that are opposite in
sign to those obtained in the first-stage regressions. Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3 present
such estimates. As predicted, each of the instruments enters with the opposite sign
observed in the first three columns. The prison variables are jointly significant at the .05
level. As in the first stage, the magnitude of the coefficients on commitments and releases
are comparable.
Table 4 presents the two-stage least squares estimates treating city crime rates as
endogenous and instrumenting with the once- and twice-lagged changes in commitments
and releases. The coefficients on city crime that we obtain are slightly more negative in
each case than the corresponding OLS coefficient in Table 2. Although the standard errors
rise substantially, the estimates are statistically different from zero at the .05 level. Each
additional city crime results in roughly a 1.3 to 2.0 person reduction in population,
compared to estimates of approximately 1.1 from OLS. The larger 2SLS estimates suggest
that any bias in the OLS estimates resulting from omitted variables or compositional
changes in city populations is overwhelmed by the natural tendency for large cities to have
higher crime rates. Our results cast some doubt on the arguments of Wilson (1 987) which
suggest that declining city populations “cause” crime rather than vice-versa. A one-
standard deviation increase in city crime rates translates into a decline in city population of
between one and two percent.l G The other covariates, which are treated as exogenous,
‘G If there are lagged variables that are omitted from the specification, but are
correlated with the instruments (which are lagged) and contemporaneous crime and
population changes, the variation from these omitted factors will mistakenly be attributed
to our instruments potentially biasing the 2SLS estimates. To test this hypothesis, we
15carry coefficients similar to those reported in the OLS specifications.
P-values from an N*R2 test of the overidentifying restrictions are reported in the
bottom panel of the table. In all three cases, the overidentifying restrictions are near the
.05 level of statistical significance. One possible reason for the relatively poor performance
of the overidentifying restrictions is the inclusion of cities in our sample that represent a
non-negligible fraction of the state’s population. For such cities, the arguments made
earlier for the erogeneity of the instruments are less persuasive. To test this hypothesis,
columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 break the sample according to whether a city has more or less
than four percent of the state’s total population. The overidentifying restrictions pass with
ease in column 4, but are rejected at the .05 level in column 5. This lends credence to the
argument that the erogeneity of the instruments is suspect for cities that are large relative
to the state. Comparing the coefficients on city crime in columns 4 and 5, the estimated
impact of crime is larger in the cities that are a small fraction of their state. This pattern is
not apparent in OLS estimates, where the city crime coefficients are actually slightly
smaller for cities that are less than four percent of the state population (-1 .12 vs. -1. 19),
The larger parameter estimates in column 4, for which the erogeneity of the instruments is
more likely, suggest that, if anything, the coefficients reported in columns 1-3 are biased
towards zero because of the inclusion of cities of all sizes.
Sect ion Ill: Usina Census Data to Identifv Differential Effects of Crime on M iaration bv
Income Group and Race
estimated Table 4 including the once-lagged dependent variable as a right-hand side
variable to capture such omitted factors. The results obtained are almost identical to those
presented in the table.
16Because the results up to this point are derived from aggregate population data, it
has been impossible to isolate differential impacts among sub-groups of the population. In
this section, we perform two types of analysis using mobility information from the 1980
Census of Population and Housing to investigate crime-related migration patterns by
income group and race. Since we only have a cross-section of 81 cities, we limit our
analysis to OLS. The first approach aggregates the individual-level data to the city level
and estimates regressions that are similar to the preceding section, but for sub-groups of
the population. The second approach employs the migration decisions of individual
households as the dependent variable (as opposed to city-level aggregates). The
advantages of the latter analysis are that it makes it possible to control for individual
household characteristics and that it eliminates ratio-bias concerns.
Analvzina Census Data Aaareaated to the Citv Level
The data used are from the PUMS 5 percent sample of the 1980 census, aggregated
to the city-level. Only half of the observations in the PUMS data were also included in the
mobility sample, leaving usable data for 2.5 percent of the U.S. population. We are able to
identify movers in and out of 90 of the 137 cities analyzed in the preceding section. In the
remaining 47 cities, central cities and surrounding areas are not separately identified in the
PUMS data. Of those 90 cities, 9 are missing data on one or more covariates, leaving 81
cities in our sample.
To construct the net migration data, we compare the place of residence of the
household head in 1975 and 1980. Households are divided into three migration categories:
stayers, comers, and goers. Households that do not move or change addresses but remain
within city limits are categorized as stayers. Those who arrive in a city or leave the city
17are classified as comers or goers respectively. In some of the analysis, we further divide
comers and goers according to whether their change of residence is within or across
SMSAS. Households are also grouped according to total household income from all sources
in 1979. Households with income below $10,000 in 1979 dollars (roughly $20,000 in
1993 dollars) are classified as “low” income. Households with 1979 income between
$10,000 and $30,000 ($20,000-$60,000 in 1993 dollars) are labeled “middle” income.
Households with income above that level are considered “high” income. Approximately 30
percent of the households fall into the low income category, 50 percent are middle income,
and the remaining 20 percent are high income. Because we only have 1979 income, we
are unable to classify households according to their initial 1975 incomes or to examine
within-household changes in income between 1975 and 1979.17
For each of the 81 cities for which we have data, the fraction of stayers, comers
and goers is computed by income group, using 1975 city population within the income
category as the denominator. We have an average of 5,856 household observations per
city, with over 1,000 observations for the smallest cities in our sample. Summary
statistics on migration patterns are presented in Table 5, Overall, net migration (comers
minus goers as a fraction of 1975 population) for the five year period is approximately -8
percent.l E Net migration rates were larger for high income households (-1 6,8 percent) and
17 Given the possible endogeneity of 1979 income, we have also examined mobility
classifying households by educational attainment, obtaining similar patterns.
1s This number is greater than the observed 3 percent aggregate decline in city
populations for the cities in our sample over the period 1975-1980. Most of that gap can
be explained by differences in birth and death rates. Annual national birth rates (per 100
population) were approximately 1.5 in this time period; comparable death rate statistics
were roughly 0.9. Assuming that the same rates apply to these cities, the differential
between birth and death rates accounts for a three percentage point gap between city
population changes and net migration. Overall, the correlation between city population
18actually positive for low income households (0.5 percent). Blacks flowed into cities on net,
while the non-black population declined by 10 percent. Roughly 30 percent of households
residing in one of these central cities in 1975 had left that city by 1980, with low income
households less likely to leave. New arrivals to cities offset three-quarters of these leavers,
with high income households less likely to come to cities. 60 percent of city out-migrants
left the SMSA; over 70 percent of the new arrivals to central cities came from outside the
SMSA.
OLS estimates of the relationship between changes in city net-migration rates and
changes in crime rates are presented in Table 6. In addition to using a cross-section rather
than a panel of data, the specifications shown in Table 6 differ from earlier estimates in
that five-year rather than one-year changes in crime rates are used (since only five-year
changes in place of residence are available). A richer set of covariates is available in
census years, Therefore, in addition to all the variables used in the previous section, the
specifications in Table 6 add the fraction of city residents completing high school, percent
in owner-occupied housing, percent employed in the manufacturing sector, mean hourly
manufacturing wage, city median family income, percent of housing units that are multi-
family, mean temperature in January, and mean annual precipitation. All of these variables
are available in the Cit v and Cou ntv Data Books published by the U.S. Census. The 1970
value of the census covariates are used as controls in Table 6. Using changes between
1970 and 1980 or the 1980 levels did not materially affect the crime coefficients.
Column 1 of Table 6 presents the estimates for all cities and income groups
combined. The coefficient on city crime, -1.39, is consistent with the estimates of the
changes and net-migration in our sample is 0.45.
19preceding two sections and is statistically significant at the .10 level. Suburban crime
changes, while carrying the same sign as previously, are imprecisely estimated. High
median family income in a city is a statistically significant predictor of city population
growth, as are high January temperatures and low rainfall. The other covariates are not
statistically significantly different from zero.
Columns 2-4 provide separate estimates of net migration by income group. High
income households are most responsive to city crime rates with a coefficient of -2.58. The
net migration response of low income households is less than one-fifth as great. Middle-
income households have an intermediate response. When the three specifications in
columns 2-4 are estimated jointly we reject the equality of the crime coefficients across
high and low income groups at the .05 level, A one standard deviation change in city
crime over the five-year period (0.01 65 crimes per capita) is associated with a 4.3 percent
decline in high-income households, a 2.0 percent fall in middle-income households, and a
0.8 percent decrease among the poor. Columns 5 and 6 divide the sample on racial lines,
with no apparent difference across races. The last two columns compare families with and
without children. Families with children are almost three times as responsive to city crime
rates. While the suburban crime coefficients are imprecisely estimated, it appears that
families with children are also more responsive to suburban crime rates.lg
Because the number of variables is large relative to the number of observations in
the specifications in Table 6, we also present the city crime coefficient from specifications
including only the crime variables and region dummies in the bottom panel of the table as a
test of the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of control variables. The estimates are
19 For a more detailed treatment of the influences of children on locational choice, see
Glendon (1 996).
20similar in all cases.
Further patterns are revealed by decomposing the net migration effects
comers and goers, and by whether moves cross SMSA lines. This breakdown
according to
is presented
in Table 7 for city crime rates. The columns in Table 7 correspond to the categories in the
previous table. In each case, the first row redisplays the coefficient on city crime rates
from Table 6, which is then decomposed in the subsequent rows. The coefficient on goers
(row 5) minus the coefficient on comers (row 2) equals the total crime-related impact on
net-migration (row 1). Within comers and goers, we further decompose the effect by
whether the migration is within or across SMSAS.
Almost all of the crime-related impact on mobility arises from increased out-
migration, as evidenced by the large magnitudes on goers compared to comers, One
possible explanation for this patterns is that current residents are better informed about
recent changes in crime than are potential in-migrants. Comparing the bottom two rows of
Table 7, those leaving cities due to crime remain in the SMSA 70 percent of the time
overall (less frequently for the rich, more frequently for blacks and families with children).
In contrast, for all out-migrants (including those who move for reasons other than crime),
40 percent remain in the SMSA.
Analvzin a Individual Hou sehold Mobilitv Dec isions usina Ce nsus Data
Focusing on individual household mobility decisions rather than city-level aggregates
has two advantages. First, it allows the inclusion of household characteristics as
covariates. Second, it eliminates concerns over ratio-bias since measurement error in city
population does not affect the dependent variable, The primary difficulty associated with
performing a household-level analysis are the computational costs. For example, to avoid
21sample selection bias when estimating the decision of whether or not to move into a
particular city, one must include all households in the sample in the estimation, even
though only a trivial fraction of the total households actually move into the city.
We use the results of the preceding city-level analysis to guide our specification
choices in reducing the computational burdens to a manageable level. Table 7
demonstrates that almost all of the crime-related net migration from cities is due to
increased outflows of residents. Therefore, in the following analysis we focus exclusively
on the decision of current city residents about whether to stay or leave. Doing so limits
the sample to residents of large cities in 1975, approximately 400,000 observations, or
roughly 15% of the 1980 PUMS mobility sample.
The results of the individual-level analysis are presented in Tables 8a and 8b. For
simplicity of interpretation, we present estimates from linear probability models where the
dependent variable is equal to one if a household residing in one of the large central cities
in our sample in 1975 remains in that city through 1980, and zero if the household leaves
the central city before 1980. As before, the five-year change in the per capita reported
crime rate captures the effect of crime. Probit and Iogit yield similar marginal effects when
evaluated at the sample means. zo All specifications in Tables 8a and 8b include the full set
of city, state, and region controls that were used in Tables 6 and 7. With the exception of
the first column, the regressions also include a wide array of househo/d-/eve/ controls:
income indicators (high, middle, and low), the age, sex, race, years of education, and
marital status of the household head, and whether the household head is a homeowner, in
20 We have also experimented with multinominal Iogit models that allow for differential
effects for those households moving within and across SMSAS. These results suggest that
crime has a larger effect on those moving within the SMSA as would be expected.
22the armed forces in 1975, or attends college in 1975. We account for correlation in the
error term for households in a given city so as not to understate the standard errors.
Failing to account for within-city correlations leads to standard error estimates that are
roughly twenty times too small on the crime coefficients. Because all of the variation in
the crime variable is at the city level, there is actually very little information gain in moving
from city-level aggregates to individual-level estimation, as reflected in the fact that the
standard errors in Tables 7 and 8 are not very different. For comparison purposes, we
report the corresponding coefficient from the city-level regressions in the bottom panel of
Table 8.
Column 1 of Table 8a includes only aggregate controls for the full sample of
households. Each additional reported crime is associated with 1.61 residents leaving the
city. In contrast to Table 6, there is some evidence that suburban crime rates matter here.
This difference is consistent with suburban crime rates having two offsetting effects on
city population. The first effect is to increase city population by reducing the outflow of
city residents to the suburbs. The second effect is to discourage those outside the SMSA
from moving into the SMSA, depressing city population. The net migration regressions in
Table 6 capture both of these effects, whereas Table 8, which looks only at the decision
on city residents to stay or go, reflects only the former.
The household-level estimate of the impact of city crime in column 1 of Table 8 is
indistinguishable from the comparable value from the aggregated regression in the bottom
panel of the table. Since the aggregated regression potentially suffer from ratio-bias, but
the individual-level regressions do not, the similarity of the two sets of estimates suggests
that ratio-bias cannot account for the observed negative relationship between crime rate
changes and population changes.
23Column 2 of Table 8a is identical to column 1 except that a full complement of
household-level controls are added to the specification. It is interesting to note that while
these variables significantly improve the R2 of the regression, the estimated impact of crime
is little changed. This increases our level of confidence in the earlier estimates using city-
Ievel aggregates, where there was concern that the set of controls was incomplete,
Having controlled for city-level characteristics household heads who are young, male,
black, have children, are single, or have lower educational attainment are more likely to
stay in central cities, Members of the military and those attending college are far more
likely to leave the city. The only surprise among the coefficients, is that having controlled
for these other factors, the rich are somewhat more likely to remain in cities.
The last three columns of Table 8a divide the sample according to household
income. High income households are more sensitive to crime, but the differences are
muted compared to Table 6. The other covariates tend to carry similar coefficients across
income groups. The first two columns of Table 8b divide the sample between blacks and
non-blacks. As before, little differential effect of crime is observed across races. The most
interesting difference between blacks and non-blacks is the effect of income. Among non-
blacks, high income is associated with remaining in central cities, controlling for other
factors, With blacks, there is no such effect. The final two columns of Table 8b split the
sample into households with and without children. Households with children are
substantially more likely to leave central cities in response to rising crime. High income
families with children are somewhat more likely to leave cities than low income families
with children, whereas the opposite is true of households without children.
Sect ion IV: co nclusions
24This paper examines the connection between crime, urban flight, and central city
decline. Rising city crime rates appear to play a causal role in city depopulation. Each
reported city crime is associated with approximately a one person decline in city residents.
There is some evidence that rising crime rates in the suburbs tend to keep people in cities.
Instrumenting using measures of criminal justice system severity yields slightly larger
estimates than OLS. Almost all of the impact of crime on falling city population is due to
increased out-migration rather than a decrease in new arrivals. Migration decisions of high-
income households are much more responsive to changes in crime rates than those of the
poor. Households with children are also more responsive to crime. Crime-related out-
migrants are much more likely to stay within the SMSA than those leaving the city for
other reasons.
Increases in crime rates and the subsequent exodus from the city impose a number
of costs on those city residents who remain behind. The most obvious cost to city
residents is the direct costs of increased crime victimization. Over the last twenty years,
the quartile of cities with the greatest increase in crime saw per capita crime roughly
double from 0.065 reported crimes per capita to O. 127; crime rates were essentially
unchanged for cities in the bottom quartile (0.069 in 1973 to 0.074 in 1993). Cohen
(1 988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1 993) estimate victim costs per crime,
incorporating out-of-pocket costs, physical and psychological damages, lost productivity,
and lost life, Valuing a lost life at $2.7 million, the typical crime reported in large cities in
1993 has victim costs of $10,200 associated with it,21 The difference in crime increases
21 The total estimated costs of crime are sensitive to the value assigned to a human
life. If the value of a human life is assumed to be $1,0 million dollars, the cost per crime
falls to $6,100,
25between top and bottom quartile cities translate into almost $600 per person per year.
Since the estimated crime gap between the two sets of cities includes only those crimes
reported to the police, the true difference in costs may be even greater.
In addition to the direct costs of crime, crime-related migration imposes further
costs on cities. Decreased city population decreases the demand for housing, causing
declines in property values. Blanchard and Katz (1 992) find the short-run (1 -5 year)
elasticity of housing value with respect to employment levels of approximately two and a
long run (1 O year) elasticity close to zero. Assuming declines in population and
employment have similar effects and taking an elasticity intermediate between those two
estimates, the crime-related migration differential between top and bottom quartile cities (7
percent of the city population) translates into a $5,500 decline in median housing values in
high versus low quartile cities. Property values will also decrease if the disamenity of crime
is capitalized into housing values (Smith 1978, Thaler 1978, and Hellman and Naroff
1979) -- an additional $16,000 if the direct costs of crime computed above are fully
capitalized .22
Because crime-related mobility is concentrated among the rich, crime will increase
concentrations of poverty in central cities, although the effects do not appear to be
particularly large, In 1975, roughly 30 percent of central city residents fell into our low
income category, 50 percent were classified as middle income and the remaining 20
percent were high income. Using our estimates of net-migration by income group in Table
6, the increases in crime in the top quartile cities by 1993 would have caused the fraction
22 Declining housing values due to capitalization of the disamenity do not entail an
additional cost to city residents, but rather are a reflection of the direct costs of
victimization cited above.
26of high income residents to fall to 18,2 percent and the fraction of low income residents to
rise to 31.6 percent, While it is unlikely that the real economic effects of a change of this
magnitude could be substantively large, it is possible that the decline in the number of rich
households imposes negative externalities on those who remain in the central city. To the
extent that peer effects are important to human capital development (Case and Katz 1991,
Benabou 1993, Cutler and Glaeser 1995), the exodus of skilled residents hurts those who
stay.
Fiscal stress on city government is likely to be linked to rising crime and differential
mobility patterns. Low-income residents will have greater need for locally-provided public
services such as police protection, public education, public transportation, and city
hospitals, In particular, high and rising crime rates are associated with increases in future
spending on police, Using panel-data from the 59 largest U.S. cities, we estimate that the
crime difference between top and bottom quartile cities translates into an additional $30
per capita annually in police expenditure.23 The poor are also less likely to be covered by
private health insurance. Public education costs are greater for low-income children, who
are disproportionately represented in special educational programs.24 Combining the
23 These estimates are obtained from city finance data for the years 1976, 1981,
1986, and 1991. We regress the five-year lead change in police expenditure per capita on
either the current crime rate, the five-year lagged change in crime, or both. We include the
same covariates as in Section II of the paper. When entered separately, the coefficient on
crimes per capita is 648 (SE= 225) and the coefficient on five-year lagged changes in crime
per capita is 696 (SE= 262). When both the level and changes in crime are included in the
same regression, both enter positively. The two coefficients are jointly, but not
individually, statistically significant, Full regression results are available from the authors
on request.
24 Crime also carries with it large costs for courts, jails, and, prisons, but these are
generally not borne by cities.
If there are increasing returns to scale in goods and services provided by city
governments, declining populations lead to inefficiencies in producing such goods.
27estimated declines in housing value due to crime with the increased levels of police
expenditure, for a fixed effective property tax rate, the impact of differential crime rates
between top and bottom quartile cities translates into roughly 40% of the mean city’s
property tax revenue.25 In comparison, municipalities in Massachusetts anticipated losing
about 14 percent of total tax revenue after the passage of Proposition 2 X (Ladd and
Wilson 1983), and property tax revenues fell by 50 percent in California after
implementation of Proposition 13.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the production of these goods is characterized
by roughly constant returns to scale (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973, Gonzalez and Mehay
1987),
25 Crime is also likely to reduce other sources of city revenues, such as sales taxes and
income taxes, on a per capita basis, The fact that most of the crime-related movers remain
within the SMSA suggests that many will continue to work in the central city.
Consequently, the tax losses through these other channels is likely to be smaller
proportionately than via property taxes. Also, to the extent that state governments
increase aid to cities experiencing fiscal stress (Yinger and Ladd 1989), this figure may
overstate the true costs borne by city residents.
28Table 1: Summary Statistics for Panel Data, 1976-1993
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
City Population
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.0213Notes to Table 1: Sample is comprised of annual observations from 1976-1993 for 137
U.S. central cities with population greater than 100,000 in population in 1975. Due to
occasional missing data, number of observations is equal to 2,165. Prison commitment
and release data are defined at the state level and are changes in rates per reported crime.
All other data are defined at the city level unless otherwise noted. All variables are
available annually except YOhigh school graduates, YOhome-owners, YOmanufacturing, and
0/0 black, which are available only in census years. % black is linearly interpolated between
decennial census years.Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Relationship Between City Population and Crime Rate















% aged 18-24 (-1)
YOaged 25-44 (-1 )








































































































































-, (.096) (.124) . . (.097) (.129) (.194)
City Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region-year
interactions No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared .310 .390 .490 .315 .393 .495
Notes: Dependent variable is Aln(city population). Sample is comprised of annual
observations from 1976-1993 for 137 U.S. central cities with population greater than
100,000 in population in 1975. Number of observations is equal to 2,165 in all columns.
Year and region dummies are included in all columns except those where region-year
interactions are present. All variables are available annually, except for YO black, which is
linearly interpolated between decennial census years. See Table 1 for further information
about the level of geographic disaggregation of the covariates. Estimates control for
heteroskedasticity by city size. Standard errors in parentheses.Table 3: First-stage and Reduced-form Estimates of State Prison Commitments and
Releases on Crime Rates and Citv Populations
A per capita city crime 0/0A city population
















YO aged 0-17 (-1)
YOaged 18-24 (-1 )
YOaged 25-44 (-1 )













































































































































,., (.027) (.036) (.055) (.031) (,123) (.189)
City Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region-Year No No Yes No No Yes
Interactions?
p-value: instruments <.001 <.001 .01 .034 .021 .048
R-squared .280 .294 .429 .257 .334 .426Notes to Table 3: Dependent variables are changes in per capita city crime in columns 1-3
and Aln(city population) in columns 4-6. Sample is comprised of annual observations from
1976-1993 for 137 U.S. central cities with population greater than 100,000 in population
in 1973. Year and region dummies are included in all specifications. Due to missing data,
number of observations is equal to 2,301 in columns 1-3 and 2,412 in columns 4-6. Prison
commitment and release data are defined at the state level and are changes in rates per
reported crime. All variables are available annually, except for % black, which is linearly
interpolated between decennial census years. See Table 1 for further information about the
level of geographic disaggregation of the covariates. Estimates control for
heteroskedasticity by city size. Standard errors in parentheses. The bottom row of the
table gives the joint significance of an F-test of the four prison variables.Table 4: 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Crime on City Population
Cities <470 Cities>4%
All cities in sample of state pop. of state pop.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)









% aged 0-17 (-1)
YOaged 18-24 (-1 )
YOaged 25-44 (-1 )







































































































City Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-year No No Yes Yes Yes
interactions
p-value: .135 .070 .039 .346 .035
overidentifying
restrictions
Number of Ohs. 2,140 2,140 2,140 1,183 957
Notes: Dependent variable is Aln(city population), Sample is comprised of annual observations from
1976-1993 for 137 U.S. central cities with population greater than 100,000 in population in 1973.
Year and region dummies are included in all specifications except those where region-year
interactions are present, Once- and twice-lagged state prison commitment and release rates per
crime are used as instruments in all columns. The P-value of an NR2 test of overidentifying
restrictions on instruments is reported in table. All variables are available annually, except for YO
black, which is linearly interpolated between decennial census years. Estimation allows for








3Table 8a: Household-level Estimates of the Decision to Stay in Central Cities
Middle
Variable All Household Heads High Income Income Low Income











































































































Controls from City-level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regressions
R-squared .029 .152 .158 .155 .142
Observations 402042 402042 73277 197089 131676
Comparable Coefficient from City-level Regression
A Per Capita Crime in City -1,50 -1.50 -1.96 -1.62 -1.07
(.74) (.74) (.90) (.86) (.61)Notes to Table 8a: The sample includes only households residing in one of the 81 central cities included in
the sample in 1975. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the household remains in the
central city in 1980, and zero otherwise. The complete set of state and city-level regressors are included
in these specifications: state real per capita income and age distribution variables in 1975, state
population growth 1975 to 1980, SMSA unemployment rate 1975, city YO black, YO graduating high
school, ‘A housing owner occupied, median family income in 1970, ‘A manufacturing, mean hourly wage
in manufacturing, YO multi-family housing, climate controls, and region dummies. We allow for correlation
in the error term across households in a given city so as not to understate the standard errors.Table 8b: Household-level Estimates of the Decision to Stay in Central Cities (Con’t)
Non-
Variable Black Black With Children No Children
A Per Capita Crime in City -1.72 -1.34 -1.80 -1.14
(.59) (.599) (.635) (.528)
A Per Capita Suburban 2.32 1.04 1,47 .641
Crime (1.21) (.930) (.982) (.837)
Years of Education -.007 -.010 -.013 -.007







































































-.083 -.100 -.056 -.117
(.010) (.009) (.010) (.010)
Control from City-level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regressions
R-squared .094 .146 .144 .158
Observations 88360 313682 135787 266255
Comparable Coefficient from City-level Regression
A Per Capita Crime in City -.47 -1.35 -1.99 -1.24
(.85) (.80) (.85) (.69)
Notes: See notes to Table 8a.Biblioara~hv
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